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RED
WE NEED TO STOP THE
START TREATY
The ‘START”, US-Russian Nuclear Arms Treaty,
SHOULD NEVER Be Ratified IN ITS PRESENT
Few, if any, experts
are willing to argue that the
But the provisions of the treaty signed earlier this year by Presidents Barak Obama and Dmitry Medvedev also degrade and impair our other national security capabilities and measures as they might affect our ability to respond to a crisis in the Middle East or in the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait.
Given the sorry state of current Russian military strategic
capability, we can reasonably ask: Is not this treaty, in essence and practical
effect, a unilateral disarmament exercise by the
After the health care legislation disaster, we face a parallel “adopt-on-trust” event on the national security front. We are saddled with a bloated and expensive mess on the domestic side because opposition was outmaneuvered and legislative hearings were avoided. In the December rush, we face the prospect of replicating that disaster on the national defense side. Surely this can be prevented.
You can read the full text of the treaty at this link: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf
I have included some relevant treaty language below.
This treaty is not “just”
between the
Limits on Aircraft
Among the red flags that leap off the page. There are limitations on the size, replacement and basing of our so called “heavy bomber” fleet, whether these aircraft are used to carry nuclear or conventional weapons.
“Each Party
shall reduce and limit its ... heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that ... the
aggregate numbers... do not exceed:
“(c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed
and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.
“(c) Existing types of heavy bombers ... for the
52H, B-IB, and B-2A....
Note: Those bombers are also needed for
conventional weapons.
Especially
note the unique value of the B-1B bomber:
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/air/bombers/b1b.html
“The B-1B is a multi-role, long-range bomber, capable of flying intercontinental missions without refueling, then penetrating present and predicted sophisticated enemy defenses. It can perform a variety of missions, including that of a conventional weapons carrier for theater operations. Through 1991, the B-1 was dedicated to the nuclear deterrence role as part of the single integrated operational plan (SIOP)”
“The B-1B's electronic jamming equipment, infrared countermeasures, radar location and warning systems complement its low-radar cross-section and form an integrated defense system for the aircraft.”
Note that
the Stealth bomber is included:
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/b2/
“The B-2 is a low-observable, strategic, long-range, heavy bomber capable of penetrating sophisticated and dense air-defense shields. It is capable of all-altitude attack missions up to 50,000ft, with a range of more than 6,000nm unrefuelled and over 10,000nm with one refueling, giving it the ability to fly to any point in the world within hours.
“Its distinctive profile comes from
the unique 'flying wing' construction. The leading edges of the wings are
angled at 33° and the trailing edge has a double-W shape. It is manufactured at
the Northrop Grumman facilities in
This treaty on its face imposes a single-basket
aggregate limit for all designated missile launchers and “heavy” bombers of 800 units, such
that our bomber aircraft inventory would be limited to the sum of 800 minus our entire missile launcher
inventory.
It is clear from other treaty language that the
restrictions apply to all such
weapon-carrying aircraft, including planes carrying low yield tactical bombs
and bunker-busting bombs so long as they are nuclear.
Basing
Restrictions
Basing restrictions for US listed bombers are draconian under this treaty, and include:
(a) No joint
basing with nuclear missiles;
(b) No deployment at all unless on a
(c) No
strategic weapons deployment (planes included) outside
Test Aircraft
Limits
Eventually we will need to develop new planes or test replacements, but a treaty
restriction will get in the way:
“Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy
bombers to no more than ten.”
One would think that ratification would now be delayed
in light of the residual distrust of the president engendered by his poorly
vetted heath care juggernaut, his ambivalence about defending
Sixty seven
votes will be needed.
Article. VI.
Clause 2: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
UNTIL
[][][]
TREATY BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER
REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Some Highlights
Article II
1. Each Party shall reduce
and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that
seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate
numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not
exceed:
(a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
(b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on
deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for
deployed heavy bombers;
(c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers,
deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and
deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.
(c) Existing types of heavy bombers are:
(i) for
the
[][][]
Article IV
1. Each Party shall base:
(a) deployed launchers of
ICBMs only at ICBM bases;
(b) deployed heavy bombers
only at air bases.
[]
7. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy
bombers to no more than ten.
8. Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at
heavy bomber flight test centers. Non-deployed heavy bombers other than test
heavy bombers shall be located only at repair facilities or production
facilities for heavy bombers.
9. Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint
basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
[][][]
Article XIII
To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this
Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or
undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall not
transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty to third parties. The
Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in
this regard. This provision shall not apply to any patterns of cooperation,
including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the
time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.
[][][]
11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty
shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party. The
obligations provided for in this paragraph shall not affect the Parties' rights
in accordance with generally recognized principles and rules of international
law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating
to visits of submarines to ports of third States. Heavy bombers may be
temporarily located outside the national territory, notification of which shall
be provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years
unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and
limitation of strategic offensive arms. If either Party raises the issue of
extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider the matter. If the
Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no
more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement
on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
3. Each
Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw
from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give
notice of its decision to the other Party. Such notice shall contain a
statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests.*
This Treaty shall terminate three months from the date
of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice
specifies a later date.
* COMMENT: Note
how differently this part scans when there are substantial doubts about the
national security resolve of the current president. Are you reassured?