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Copyright © 2010 by Jay B. Gaskill
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WE NEED TO STOP THE START TREATY
The ‘START”, US-Russian Nuclear Arms Treaty,
SHOULD NEVER Be Ratified IN ITS PRESENT
Few, if any, experts
are willing to argue that the
But the provisions of the treaty signed earlier this year by Presidents Barak Obama and Dmitry Medvedev also degrade and impair our other national security capabilities and measures as they might affect our ability to respond to a crisis in the Middle East or in the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait.
Given the sorry state of current Russian military strategic
capability, we can reasonably ask: Is not this treaty, in essence and practical
effect, a unilateral disarmament exercise by the
After the health care legislation disaster, we face a parallel “adopt-on-trust” event on the national security front. We are saddled with a bloated and expensive mess on the domestic side because opposition was outmaneuvered and legislative hearings were avoided. In the December rush, we face the prospect of replicating that disaster on the national defense side. Surely this can be prevented.
You can read the full text of the treaty at this link: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf
I have included some relevant treaty language below.
This treaty is not “just”
Limits on Aircraft
Among the red flags that leap off the page. There are limitations on the size, replacement and basing of our so called “heavy bomber” fleet, whether these aircraft are used to carry nuclear or conventional weapons.
“Each Party shall reduce and limit its ... heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that ... the aggregate numbers... do not exceed:
“(c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.
“(c) Existing types of heavy bombers ... for the
52H, B-IB, and B-2A....
Note: Those bombers are also needed for conventional weapons.
Especially note the unique value of the B-1B bomber:
“The B-1B is a multi-role, long-range bomber, capable of flying intercontinental missions without refueling, then penetrating present and predicted sophisticated enemy defenses. It can perform a variety of missions, including that of a conventional weapons carrier for theater operations. Through 1991, the B-1 was dedicated to the nuclear deterrence role as part of the single integrated operational plan (SIOP)”
“The B-1B's electronic jamming equipment, infrared countermeasures, radar location and warning systems complement its low-radar cross-section and form an integrated defense system for the aircraft.”
Note that the Stealth bomber is included:
“The B-2 is a low-observable, strategic, long-range, heavy bomber capable of penetrating sophisticated and dense air-defense shields. It is capable of all-altitude attack missions up to 50,000ft, with a range of more than 6,000nm unrefuelled and over 10,000nm with one refueling, giving it the ability to fly to any point in the world within hours.
“Its distinctive profile comes from
the unique 'flying wing' construction. The leading edges of the wings are
angled at 33° and the trailing edge has a double-W shape. It is manufactured at
the Northrop Grumman facilities in
This treaty on its face imposes a single-basket aggregate limit for all designated missile launchers and “heavy” bombers of 800 units, such that our bomber aircraft inventory would be limited to the sum of 800 minus our entire missile launcher inventory.
It is clear from other treaty language that the restrictions apply to all such weapon-carrying aircraft, including planes carrying low yield tactical bombs and bunker-busting bombs so long as they are nuclear.
Basing restrictions for US listed bombers are draconian under this treaty, and include:
(a) No joint basing with nuclear missiles;
(b) No deployment at all unless on a
strategic weapons deployment (planes included) outside
Test Aircraft Limits
Eventually we will need to develop new planes or test replacements, but a treaty restriction will get in the way:
“Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy
bombers to no more than ten.”
One would think that ratification would now be delayed
in light of the residual distrust of the president engendered by his poorly
vetted heath care juggernaut, his ambivalence about defending
Sixty seven votes will be needed.
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:
(a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
(b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;
(c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.
(c) Existing types of heavy bombers are:
1. Each Party shall base:
(a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases;
(b) deployed heavy bombers only at air bases.
7. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy
bombers to no more than ten.
8. Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy bomber flight test centers. Non-deployed heavy bombers other than test heavy bombers shall be located only at repair facilities or production facilities for heavy bombers.
9. Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall not transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty to third parties. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. This provision shall not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.
11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party. The obligations provided for in this paragraph shall not affect the Parties' rights in accordance with generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States. Heavy bombers may be temporarily located outside the national territory, notification of which shall be provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. If either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party. Such notice shall contain a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.*
This Treaty shall terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice specifies a later date.
* COMMENT: Note how differently this part scans when there are substantial doubts about the national security resolve of the current president. Are you reassured?