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A PREDICTION:

The next critical decision point will take place in March, 2008.  Not coincidently, the Iranian sponsored insurgent militia of Al Sadr, having been dramatically disrupted by General Petraeus’ forces, has “gone to ground” until then. 

No one wants us to take sides in an internecine sectarian struggle – indeed, the counter-insurgency doctrine forbids “taking sides”.  But the question is one of semantics.  If there is to be a stabilization of the current Iraqi government (in some acceptable form), the forces arrayed against the democratic government – whether driven by ideology or sectarian grievance or simple power lust – must necessarily be overcome.  So a degree of “taking sides” is inevitable, if we are to succeed.

The increase in military forces in Iraq has been coupled with a significant increase in competence, only partially offset by the retirement of allied forces (the British, having never really pacified Basra, are pulling out).

Wresting order and stability from a persistent insurgency is a long term project.  For some perspective, consider just two examples:  The IRA insurgency in Northern Ireland, and the radical Marxist insurgency in Malaysia. The British invested almost thirty years in the IRA project, fully succeeding only within the last four years.  In the Malaysian insurgency, communist guerrilla forces were eventually subdued with the ongoing help of about 35,000 British troops, assisted by much smaller force contingents supplied by Australia and New Zealand.  The Malay anti-insurgency project lasted from about 1948 to 1960 - twelve years. 

In both cases, a mix of psychological warfare, brute force and very long term stubborn commitment to the goal succeeded with a relatively smaller force than was thought necessary by some experts.

Remember the pre-surge debate in the Pentagon?  The choice under discussion was to “Go big” or “Go long”. 

Anti-insurgency experts knew all along that, whatever the immediate benefits of a short term troop increase, there is no substitute for “going long”.

Here is the irony of the day.  The historic legacy of this Bush administration is inextricably linked to the legacy of the next. 

None of the serious players in Washington – whatever the current rhetoric – can permit a chaotic debacle to unfold in Iraq, nor can they yet muster the political support for the substantial increase in military forces that our response to the jihad will eventually and inevitably require. 

The Iraq on Inauguration Day in January, 2009, will probably look a lot like the current Iraq. The elected government will still be struggling to assert full control over the country and the insurgency will be held in check only with the ongoing help of American ground forces in-country.  No doubt the numbers of American troops will be several thousand less than at present. 

The new president will then own the outcome.  If the lessons of the successful anti-insurgency efforts of the past are any guide, American forces will be able to succeed only by stubbornly hanging tough for the long haul. To the extent that the next president succeeds, the Bush legacy will be part of that success. To the extent that the next president fails, you can be sure that, as Mr. Truman was fond of saying, the buck stops on the current president’s desk.